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Abstract 
 
This article theorises the territorial solidarity and fiscal federalism and compares 
Switzerland with the European Union. While inter-territorial solidarity is a prerequisite for 
legitimate fiscal equalisation, such equalisation in turn also contributes to the legitimacy of 
and solidarity within federal political systems. By cutting across territorial and ethno-
national communities, fiscal transfers often contribute to both a “civic” sense of belonging 
and a “cosmopolitan” identity. After placing types and degrees of (inter-)territorial 
solidarity at the heart of our conceptual perspective, we discuss the effects of such 
solidarity through an analysis of two different forms of “federal” equalisation. Comparing 
the recently reformed Swiss fiscal equalisation system with the EU structural funds allows 
us to infer if, and how, the fiscal dimension of federalism matters for feelings of solidarity, 
reciprocity, unity and, ultimately, for the legitimacy of the very (nation-state or Union) 
structures that are to contribute to the ever-growing prosperity and happiness of their 
people(s). In Switzerland, a civic understanding of nationhood and cross-cutting cleavages 
were necessary conditions for extensive, effective and legitimate fiscal equalisation. We 
infer that, for the EU, this means that strengthening the equalisation component of the 
structural funds would contribute to an ever closer Union in a political sense: because fiscal 
equalisation and inter-territorial solidarity are interdependent, reinforcing the one also 
means cementing the other. Future studies of the EU and federal-type arrangements are 
advised to pay more explicit attention to the solidarity-element of territoriality – or the 
territoriality of (fiscal) solidarity. 
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Introduction 
 
This article theorises solidarity in multi-level systems and compares the recently 
reformed fiscal equalisation scheme of Switzerland with the EU’s structural funds. Our 
point of departure is that inter-territorial solidarity (between cantons, Länder, states, 
provinces, autonomous communities or EU Member States) is a prerequisite for fiscal 
equalisation, as much as inter-personal and inter-group solidarity are for many national-
level redistributive policies. Equalisation in turn contributes to the overall legitimacy of a 
polity because – ideally – transfers contribute to a “civic” sense of belonging and a 
“cosmopolitan” shared identity by cutting across entrenched ethno-national communities, 
creating une solidarité de fait, as Robert Schumann (1950) once described. Fiscal federalism 
and connected financial equalisation schemes can also contribute to a stronger feeling of a 
“shared destiny” among the territorial units and the people within a federal system. This 
feeling of solidarity and reciprocity is a key element of federal democracy and federal 
political culture (Burgess 2012). To what extent this ideal applies to the EU, particularly by 
scaling down to the regional level (Hooghe and Marks 2001), is the focus of this article. 
Our method to answer this question empirically is to offer a short analysis of Swiss 
fiscal equalisation, which maximises both the legitimacy and solidarity dimension and 
whose political system, through strong cantonal identities and due to its confederal nature 
especially in the fiscal domain, approximates the EU system better than any other currently 
existing political system (Church and Dardanelli 2005).I The stability of the Swiss system, 
the creative character of its fiscal equalisation (in force only since 2008), and its 
resemblance to the EU as regards bottom-up, executive federalism allow us to draw 
conclusions on when, how and why fiscal equalisation is able to maximise solidarity. We 
then apply these conclusions to the EU in the form of hypotheses, analysing in particular a) 
the constellation of “fiscal losers” and “winners” at Member State level; b) the impact of 
this constellation on EU-wide feelings of inter-territorial solidarity; and c) potential avenues 
to increase inter-territorial solidarity – plus, through this, to achieve a stronger feeling of 
common belonging and shared identity at Union-level – by reforming the EU’s fiscal 
equalisation. 
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The first section conceptualises territorial solidarity in connection to fiscal equalisation. 
The second describes Swiss fiscal equalisation while the third section is dedicated to 
analysing both equalisation and solidarity within the EU. The fourth section compares the 
two systems before we conclude. 
 
1. Inter-territorial solidarity and fiscal equalisation 
 
The literature on solidarity and fiscal equalisation is both vast and scarce. It is vast, 
because scholars from political economy, federalism, EU integration and even nationalism 
studies have at times discussed the importance of the fiscal dimension for polity-building 
(e.g. Burgess 2006a; Kymlicka 2001; Lijphart 1977). The importance of fiscal arrangements 
as part of the “self-rule” and “shared-rule” dimension in federal states has already been 
pointed out by Kenneth Wheare (1964). Other authors, such as Oates (1999) and Dafflon 
(2012), have also pointed towards the connection between federalism, fiscal relations and 
solidarity. However, scarcity arises in the sense that rarely has a causal connection between 
inter-territorial solidarity (as different from inter-personal solidarity) and fiscal equalisation 
been made, let alone been “tested” empirically. The recent outpour on “multi-level 
governance” (e.g. Bache & Flinders 2004, Benz 2009, Piattoni 2010) has only partially filled 
this lacuna. 
The problem is that while we may observe a “re-territorialisation” (Burgess 2006b) of 
politics, the various mechanisms that link territory to politics at the nation-state level – e.g. 
collective identity (Risse 2010), imagination (Anderson 1983), control (Sack 1986), instinct 
(Ardrey 1975 [1966]), or societal diversity (Livingston 1956) – cannot be transformed 
“upwards” (to the EU) or “downwards” (to the regional level) without not also modifying 
their scope. A case in point is solidarity. For solidarity to make analytical sense in multilevel 
polities such as the EU, inspiration must thus be drawn from federal political systems, 
where both the constituent units and the overarching polity have a direct effect on the 
citizenry (Forsyth 1981). Moreover, the relations between states, regions and the European 
level become even more complex than in federal states, because in addition to the 
interaction between the European, state and regional level, in the EU also bargaining among 
states (and competition between regions) can be observed (Keating 1988, Bartolini 2005). 
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There also exists a direct link between regions and the European level symbolised by the 
Committee of the Regions. 
Nevertheless, even in federal studies solidarity as a key element of fiscal equalisation is 
rarely made explicit, so that one has to turn to political geography and studies of state 
formation to make sense of a) what binds people together not so much within, but rather 
across different territories; and this b) to an extent that they are willing to sacrifice some of 
their own wealth in favour of that of others.  
The Oxford English Dictionary defines solidarity as “unity or agreement of feeling or 
action, especially among individuals with a common interest; mutual support within a 
group.” Less visible but equally crucial, solidarity underpins most redistributive policies at 
nation-state level, not just since the advent of the welfare state (Companje et al. 2009). 
Such policies in turn contribute to ever-growing feelings of solidarity (de Beer and Koster 
2009, 50). For the EU, this translates into output-oriented legitimacy (Scharpf 1999, 5), 
which in turn depends on a “rescaling” of policies, politics and polity (Delaney 1997, 
Somerville 2004) to the European and/or the regional (and even local; cf. the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government of 1985). 
Deductively, then, we can imagine solidarity between individuals and solidarity between 
collectives; additionally, there is solidarity between territorial and solidarity between non-
territorial collectives. Significantly for us, the Lisbon Treaty lists both under Article 2: 
“solidarity between generations and […] solidarity between Member States.” Table 1 shows 
all three possible combinations of solidarity – by definition, individuals are non-territorial, 
hence the one empty cell. 
 
Level/Basis Non-territorial Territorial 
Individual Inter-personal solidarity - 
Collective Inter-group solidarity Inter-territorial solidarity 
Table 1: Forms of solidarity 
 
Classic accounts of liberal democracy have tended to focus on the first column and 
placed individual rights above territorial claims to justice (Greer 2006), which is precisely 
why federalism can be perceived as having a slightly undemocratic touch (Basta Fleiner 
2000: 94). In the French ideal of republican equality and in the Anglo-American conception 
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of liberty, the state is either regarded as a means to foster unity and cohesion (through 
Jacobin centralisation) or to be kept small to allow markets to thrive (privatisation). And 
yet only a federal ideology “in the weak sense” (King 1982) is able to reconcile all three 
forms of solidarity in a legitimate way. 
First, by reconciling deep-seated collective and territorial imaginations with the need to 
collaborate in a mutually binding way on a greater scale. Federations, by breaking larger 
entities down into several smaller polities, allow for inter-personal solidarity in, ideally, the 
same homogeneous entities that Rousseau envisaged as conditio sine qua non for democracy 
to work.II 
Second, within the overarching whole, these entities are the bearers of territorial group 
rights, whether in essentially bi-national (e.g. Canada or Belgium), multinational (e.g. 
Bosnia), and multi-lingual federations (Switzerland), or in the traditional mono-national 
federations (Germany, Australia, USA). This creates the basis for inter-territorial solidarity 
– or its waning, if to strengthen ties within a community means questioning those between 
them. 
Finally, any remaining collective but non-territorial interests (be they socio-economic, 
ideational, religious, or non-territorial minority groups) can organise at the “national”, 
“regional” and/or the “local” level to argue their place in deciding on inter-group 
solidarity. Consequently, it can be argued that the application of the federal principle to 
diverse societies contributes to inter-group solidarity by allowing a re-adjustment of 
political categories on different political and territorial levels as well as between them, and 
therefore contributes to a greater sense of justice in both a normative and a practical sense 
(Wayne 2001, Requejo 2005).  
Focusing on inter-territorial solidarity in particular, its importance for federal political 
systemsIII is expressed in the need for fiscal equalisation to address both horizontal and 
vertical imbalances (Watts 1996: 41). Equalisation in narrower terms refers to transfers that 
stem from  
 
a recognition that disparities in wealth among regions within a federation are likely to have a corrosive 
effect on cohesion within a federation. Indeed, it is for this reason that in most European federations 
equalisation transfers have been labelled “solidarity” transfers. (Watts 1996: 45) 
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Because disparities might threaten unity, equalisation is an expression of solidarity. But 
the relationship between inter-territorial solidarity, fiscal equalisation and overall legitimacy 
can only be circular, as we show in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: The circularity of inter-territorial solidarity 
 
There are thus three interactions at work. First, between solidarity and equalisation: a 
minimum level of solidarity is a condition for fiscal equalisation. Both the extent and the 
very existence of fiscal equalisation constitute the ultimate test of inter-territorial solidarity. 
However, some examples demonstrate a fundamental dilemma in this circular relationship: 
whether it is Catalonia’s call for fiscal autonomy à la Basque Country and Navarre, or even 
for independence because it does not want to fund the other Spanish regions’ expenditures 
by having to cut its own budget; Bart De Wever’s disagreement over Flanders having to 
“pay for the unemployed in Wallonia”; or Bavaria’s appeal to the Constitutional Court over 
the current inter-Länder fiscal equalisation.IV Thus, solidarity and equalisation are 
permanently contested and re-negotiated in federal systems, because commitments to 
financial equalisation among federal units can be seen as a limitation to the autonomy of 
the (richer) units in a federal system. 
Second, financial equalisation has become more and more frequent in federal and non-
federal countries – but also more contested – since it also relates to wider economic 
questions of fair competition and fiscal discipline (Rodden 2006). Thus, to be perceived as 
legitimate, equalisation must give expression to territorial differences on both sides of the 
equation, i.e. at the paying as well as at the receiving end. Equalisation only contributes to 
the legitimacy of a polity if not only the net recipients, but also the net contributors regard 
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it as necessary. The EU accomplishes this sort of “output legitimacy” with the trick of 
“rescaling” its projects to the regional level, but then consistently aggregating the benefits 
to the national level – in this way, because every Member State has regions that receive 
money, there simply are no losers. 
Third, legitimacy strengthened in such a way contributes to solidarity and makes the 
circle come to a close. This is because the legitimacy of each policy contributes to the 
aggregate legitimacy of political decisions in general. Equalisation is thus not only a 
consequence, but also a cause of solidarity through the provision of specific benefits. 
Hence, one would expect those who profit the most from a given equalisation system to be 
amongst the most ardent favours. Therefore, in a democratic setting where decisions are 
taken by majorities (i.e. anything ranging from simple plurality to unanimity), equalisation 
can only work if there are more winners than losers, defined in the very territorial terms 
used by the equalisation system itself. As the Swiss description below demonstrates, the 
new fiscal equalisation scheme was overwhelmingly approved because all but very few (and 
small) cantons are now better off. The open expression of such a form of inter-cantonal 
solidarity (in a nation-wide referendum) has in turn significantly strengthened the overall 
legitimacy of the Swiss political system. 
Some argue that the EU will never be able to reproduce societal togetherness with the 
same intensity as has been achieved at the national level. Hence, no (inter-personal) “duty to 
accept solidaristic sacrifices derived from the premises of essential sameness” will ever arise 
(Scharpf 1999: 12). At the same time, however, the crises in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and 
Cyprus and the adoption of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have lifted EU-wide 
(inter-territorial) solidarity – at least for the Eurozone-members – to an unprecedented level 
that could well pave the way for a banking union and, indeed, to the “ever closer union” 
outlined by Barroso (2012): 
 
The stronger countries must leave no doubts about their willingness to stick together and about their 
sense of solidarity. […] Fairness is an essential condition for making the necessary economic reforms socially 
and politically acceptable and, above all, because fairness is a question of social justice. […] the economic and 
monetary union raises the question of a political union and the European democracy that must underpin it. 
[…] Let us not be afraid of the word: we will need to move towards a federation of nation states.  
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Our argument is that in the absence of a strong sense of togetherness (or inter-personal 
solidarity), which at the nation-state level has been a condition for (the legitimacy of) 
redistributive policies, the economic challenge posed by the current crisis could well work 
as a trigger to increase the equalisation component within the cohesion policy to an extent 
that it becomes a powerful creator of inter-territorial solidarity, which in turn legitimises 
(further) equalisation and political union. 
Centring this debate on solidarity gives expression to the fact that in multi-level polities 
two challenges arise: a) how to achieve solidarity between territorial communities that goes 
beyond mutual recognition, i.e. one that involves a willingness to make specific sacrifices 
that explicitly benefit others; and b) how to reconcile such inter-territorial solidarity with 
other (territorial or non-territorial, personal or collective) forms of solidarity. Is this a zero-
sum game, or are the two mutually enhancing? For lack of space, this article deals 
exclusively with the first challenge. Ultimately, however, while it is true that “a solidaristic 
substrate is required for the formation of a collective identity” (Eriksen 2011: 83), what is 
equally true is that multiple layers can give rise to multiple forms of solidarity. We now turn 
to the Swiss case for an illustration of how the relation between inter-territorial solidarity, 
legitimacy and fiscal equalisation can be empirically assessed and what lessons can be 
learned from this. 
 
2. Fiscal Equalisation in Switzerland 
 
The purpose of this section is to show how fiscal equalisation and territorial solidarity 
relate to each other in one particular case. Studying Switzerland is useful because it is, for 
some, “the most federal” country in the world (Elazar 1993: 12), meaning that its three-
layered structure of governance can serve as an inductive model. The second reason is that 
Switzerland has recently reformed its fiscal equalisation scheme: the current system was 
approved by a referendum in 2004 and has entered into force in early 2008. The 2004 
popular vote also allows us to observe how the different cantons (that is, their electorates) 
have received the reform. The old system combined a convoluted list of subsidies with 
cantonal shares in federal revenues and scaled cantonal contributions to federal social 
expenditure (Dafflon 2005: 132–4). The new system is structured into three “pots”, each 
with a different logic and payments detached from the other two. The following 
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subsections discuss the legal framework, provide data for the years 2008 until 2013, and 
draw three conclusions which we then apply to the EU. 
Legal framework 
The Swiss fiscal equalisation scheme is regulated by the Federal Act of 3 October 2003 
on Fiscal Equalisation and Cost Compensation (Bundesgesetz über den Finanz- und 
Lastenausgleich, FiLaG) and the accompanying Ordinance of 7 November 2007 (Verordnung 
über den Finanz- und Lastenausgleich, FiLaV). The goals of the equalisation scheme are to 
“strengthen the financial autonomy of the cantons” and “decrease differences in terms of 
fiscal capacity and tax burden” between the 26 sub-national units (Art. 2a-b FiLaG). Money 
is redistributed both horizontally, from the “richer” cantons, and vertically, from the 
Confederation, to the “poorer” cantons in both cases. There are two ways in which the 
dichotomy of “rich”/”poor” is defined: cantonal economic resources and extra “costs” 
arising from a canton’s topographical and/or social structure. Finally, there is a temporary 
compensation (for the 28 years from 2008 until 2036) for the losers in the transition away 
from the previous system. 
First, the “resource” or “tax potential” of each canton represents the sum of taxable 
income of private individuals, their property, and the taxable profit of corporations divided 
by the resident population (Art. 3.2 FiLaG; see Dafflon 2005: 156, for the precise formula). 
The nationwide average forms the benchmark against which each canton is then measured. 
Cantons below this average count as “resource poor”, cantons above as “resource rich” 
(Art. 3.5 FiLaG). Figure 2 shows the Swiss cantons and their position in the resource index 
for 2012. The money received from this and the other two pots can be disposed of freely 
by the cantonal authorities – unlike in the previous system, where around 75 per cent of 
the money distributed vertically was earmarked for specific projects (through matching 
grants in the form of subsidies; Dafflon 2005: 140). 
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Figure 2: The “rich” and “poor” Swiss cantons (EFV 2012: 11) 
 
Figure 2 clearly outlines that despite the fact that Switzerland is generally seen as a very 
rich country, with a strong tradition of banking and solid fiscal policies, there is 
nevertheless a strong pattern of economic diversity among the cantons. In this, the 
differences between the cantons in term of fiscal possibilities not only cut across classic 
cleavages, such as the linguisticV and the religiousVI cleavage, but also across a newer, 
urban-rural divide (Linder et al. 2008), given that both the urban cantons Zurich (ZH), 
Geneva (GE), Basel-City (BS) and Vaud (VD), as well as the more “peripheral” cantons 
Zug (ZG), Schwyz (SZ), Nidwalden (NW) and Basel-Countryside (BL) count as rich in this 
sense. 
The second fiscal equalisation stream centres on extra costs. Significantly, this stream 
was added at a later stage in the reform process and was meant to buy the support of net 
contributors by giving them something in return (Cappelletti et al. 2012: 12–3). It pays 
money to cantons suffering from either or both of two types of burdens: those arising 
from peripheral location, inaccessibility of the cantonal territory, and/or low density 
structures (Art. 7 FiLaG), on the one hand, and extra costs arising from an above-average 
proportion of elderly, poor, and/or unemployed persons (Art. 8 FiLaG), on the other. A 
total of eight geo-topographical and socio-demographic variables are taken into account for 
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the operationalisation of “costs” of this kind: average altitude, terrain steepness, settlement 
structure, and inverse population density for the first compensation mechanism; poverty, 
age, share of foreign nationals, and a “core city indicator” for the second (EFV 2012, 14). 
Some of these criteria lack economic justification (Dafflon 2005: 170-2) and respond more 
to the needs of creating a sufficiently large majority of cantons in favour of the overall 
system – a “package deal”, as Cappelletti et al. (2012: 9–10) call it. 
This is even more valid for the third stream, limited in time to 2036 and designed to 
compensate cantons that excessively lost in the transition away from the old equalisation 
scheme (Schaltegger and Frey 2003: 252). In allusion to EU terminology, the official 
English translation of this third stream is “cohesion fund” (EFV 2012, 15), but the literal 
translation of the German Härteausgleich would be “duress equalisation” (Art. 19 FiLaG). 
Figure 3 depicts the financial flows for 2012 including all three fiscal streams. 
 
 
Figure 3: Swiss fiscal equalisation, 2012 (EFV 2012: 17) 
 
As can be seen, five groups of cantons emerge. Eight cantons (bottom left) draw a net 
profit from the cohesion fund, are financially weak and subject to excessive costs. Hence, 
they are triple winners. Of the eight financially strong cantons (on the right), on the other 
hand, only two do not fall prey to excessive costs and are therefore payers on all three 
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accounts (triple losers). The other six financially strong cantons at least profit from cost 
equalisation, although situated above the Swiss average in terms of financial resources (cost 
winners). Two other cantons (Aargau (AG) and Solothurn (SO)) are financially weak, but do 
not have excessive costs, nor are they transition losers (resource winners). A final group of 
eight cantons is financially weak and has excessive costs, but does not receive payments 
through the – transitional – cohesion fund; cantons in this group we can be called cost and 
equalisation winners. 
Winners and losers 
All but the two cost compensation mechanisms (second stream) are funded by both 
federal and cantonal contributions. The ratio of this division is one third for the cantons 
and two thirds for the Confederation, for the Cohesion Fund (Art. 19.2 FiLaG): all cantons 
pay into the fund according the number of inhabitants, but only eight also receive 
something in return. For resource equalisation, the cantonal share is “between at least two 
thirds and a maximum of 80 per cent of federal payments” (Art. 4.2 FiLaG). In 2012, the 
amount paid by all cantons together was equivalent to 40.7 per cent of the contribution 
effectuated by the Federal Government; in 2008, it had been a high 70 per cent (EFV 
2012). 
A more interesting statistic is that of net per capita payments. Figure 4 shows the 
average annual net per capita payments for each canton between 2008 and 2012 in CHF; a 
negative payment denotes a disbursement to a canton, a positive payment means the 
canton had to contribute. Seen as the aggregate over the last five years, there were thus 
eight “net losers” and 18 “net winners”. The eight losers are the same that were expected 
to be net contributors at the time the federal referendum took place (Cappelletti et al. 2012: 
11), so this division has remained stable over time. Moreover, the latest official policy 
evaluation shows that the rich cantons have grown by an average of 22.3 per cent, between 
2007 and 2011, while the poor cantons have grown by “only” 17 per cent (EFV 2011, 8). 
The potential of Zug, Vaud and Schwyz has even increased by a record 35.7, 34.1 and 33 
per cent, respectively (ibid.). 
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Figure 4: Net contributors and recipients in Switzerland, 2008-12 
 
2.1. Inter-territorial solidarity in Switzerland 
Because the Federal Act of which the new fiscal equalisation was part entailed wide-
ranging modifications of the Federal Constitution, a popular vote had to take place that 
needed to muster a majority of both individual and cantonal votes (BR 2004). On 28 
November 2004, a large majority of both cantons (23 out of 26) and citizens (64 per cent) 
agreed to the new division of tasks between Confederation and cantons and, through this, 
also to the new equalisation scheme (Neugestaltung des Finanzausgleichs und der Aufgabenteilung 
zwischen Bund und Kantonen, NFA). Only in three cantons did a majority of citizens reject the 
NFA; turnout was a low 36.9 per cent (BK 2004). 
Analysing the 2004 referendum more closely allows us to draw several conclusions as 
to the underlying feeling of solidarity. Clearly, the more a canton was to profit from the 
new equalisation scheme, the more its citizens were in favour of it. Figure 5 shows the 
strong correlation between the share of no-votes in 2004 and the average per capita 
payments over the entire period for which we have data (Pearson’s r = .754, p < .01). The 
only three cantons that rejected the NFA (Zug, Schwyz and Nidwalden) were all to 
consistently pay more into the equalisation schemes than they would receive (ranking first, 
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second and fifth in Figure 4), while the highest approval rates were registered in the 
cantons benefitting the most (e.g. Uri, Jura, Fribourg, Obwalden). 
 
 
Figure 5: Benefits of Swiss fiscal equalisation by its approval rate 
 
Three conclusions can be deduced from this. First, the perception of profit seems to 
have had an influence on attitudes towards nationwide solidarity. If the NFA was regarded 
as the most important element of nation-wide solidarity, then support for it was strongest 
at the receiving and weakest at the paying end of the fiscal equalisation scale. 
Second, the reform managed to create few losers in the sense of consistently having to 
pay and never receiving anything in return. The three different pots have allowed 18 of 26 
cantons to end up with a positive balance after six years. Moreover, only three of the six 
net payers rejected the NFA, and they are all very small and Catholic cantons, whose 
combined weight of no-votes (54’644) was less than, for example, the number of yes-votes 
in St. Gall alone (64’749). Bringing many cantons, and especially the larger ones, on board 
was therefore key to the success of the reform. 
Third, achieving this degree of consensus is expensive. For 2012, the Swiss 
Confederation paid 3’102 million CHF (ca. 3.2 billion USD), whereas all the cantons 
together paid 1’575 million CH (ca. 1.6 billion USD). Achieving a strong sense of territorial 
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solidarity therefore requires a strong centre and strong component units, in terms of being 
able to share the overall financing of the system: the vertical component significantly 
lessens the individual contribution each canton has to make. However, where cantonal 
contributions rise disproportionately and in times of general fiscal crisis, fiscal equalisation 
is questioned as being derailed and exaggerated.VII We now apply these three conclusions to 
the EU polity.  
 
3. The EU System 
 
EU Regional Policy is one of the oldest policy areas of the European Union and has 
been a constant issue of discussion among Member States (Miric 2010, Mellors & 
Copperthwaite 2005 [1990], Balchin et al. 1999). While it was recognised that the creation 
of a Single Market, amongst a variety of Member States with different economic strengths 
and weaknesses, needed to be counter-balanced by some form of financial support for 
under-developed regions, the exact amount of money and its implementation via EU 
Regional Policy have been at the centre of a number of heated debates within the EU 
(Tondl 2004). However, the fact that Regional Policy has become the single most 
important policy in the EU budget demonstrates the importance of this policy. Moreover, 
at least one instrument explicitly makes the same point as we advance it here: the EU 
“Solidarity Fund”, through which “the Community should show its solidarity” by 
providing grants to help after natural disasters (cf. Council Regulation 2012/2020, 
preamble). But what kind of fiscal equalisation does the EU have to give expression to 
inter-territorial solidarity? 
EU “fiscal equalisation” 
Börzel and Hosli (2003: 188) write that “in contrast to federal systems, the EU is not 
endowed with an overall redistributive responsibility at the central level, despite the 
existence of the Structural and Cohesion Funds. The EU’s current setup clearly differs 
from most existing federal systems in its lack of a general income redistribution scheme.” 
One reason for the absence of explicit redistributive activity is certainly a lack of a 
substantial EU budget. The EU’s sources of income can be divided into three groups: 
customs duties on goods coming from outside, a share in the VAT levied on all goods sold 
within the EU, and Member State contributions as a percentage on their GNP (which is by 
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far the biggest share of the EU’s overall budget). Nevertheless, precisely because most of 
the EU’s expenditures fall into a quasi-redistributive basket based on territory, it is 
appropriate to regard the structural fundsVIII as the functional equivalent to fiscal 
equalisation – all the more so since, again for Börzel and Hosli (2003: 191), “the EU largely 
resembles a system of cooperative federalism”, where the upper level regulates and lower 
levels execute. 
But unlike the current practice in Switzerland, there is no explicit horizontal transfer of 
funds.IX EU structural funding works indirectly and vertically. It is paid by the EU, whose 
main source of funding is through Member State contributions. But since these are based 
on a country’s GNP, richer Member States pay more into the pot for structural funds, 
while poorer countries tend to have poorer regions and therefore profit more from the 
funds. In practice, this means that Member States contribute to the EU budget, and the 
EU Commission (together with governments and regional representatives of the Member 
States) decides which regions should be awarded funding from the EU’s budget pot on 
regional funding. While “cohesion” has political, social, and economic connotations, 
specifically the first one as expressing “solidarity for the weaker regions” (Evans 2004, 21) 
interests us in this discussion. 
At the national-level, because all EU Member States are recipients of money from the 
structural funds (e.g. Cadman et al. 2010), there are no losers, only those who win more 
and those who win less. Matters are different if we turn to what remains after a Member 
State’s contributions are subtracted from the benefits received through the structural funds. 
Figure 6 lists the countries by per capita net recipients, i.e. how much money each resident 
theoretically received after deducting payments to the EU budget in 2010 (negative 
amounts mean net payments).X Similar to the Swiss case, there are more territorial net 
recipients (16) than net payers (11), but the latter constitute a much larger group, both in 
terms of members and population size. 
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Figure 6: EU per capita net recipients in 2010 
 
Citizen perception 
EU citizens never had a chance to vote on the all-encompassing system of the 
structural funds in a binding way, unlike the Swiss electorate in 2004. The only way to 
gauge the legitimacy of the structural funds is therefore through surveys (Osterloh 2011: 2). 
In this section we compare EU-enthusiasts and -sceptics with net recipients and 
contributors using Eurobarometer and other European survey data. The main question to 
be answered is how Europeans perceive the current system of what we call the EU fiscal 
equalisation system, i.e. the structural funds. What are changes over time and across 
countries? Are Germans really the most sceptical because they are paying the most, as we 
would expect from our Swiss observation, and South- and East-Europeans the most 
supportive of the funds – and, by implication, also of the EU as such? 
At the national level, Figure 7 plots the mean attitude to EU unification against the 
share of residents for whom EU membership is a good thing.XI While except for Latvia, 
the UK and Hungary all countries are situated above one of the two arithmetic means, for 
the overwhelming majority of EU citizens membership is principally a good thing. 
Obviously the two measures are positively correlated (Pearson’s r = .444, p < .01). 
However, while the correlation between net recipients (in 2010) and mean attitudes to 
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EU unification is positive and significant (Pearson’s r = .420, p < .01), the correlation 
between per capita net recipients and mean attitudes to EU unification is only very small 
and insignificant (r = .106, p = .599). Moreover, the correlation between per capita net 
recipients and the proportion for whom EU membership is good is negative (r = -.315, p = 
.109). Indeed, the strongest and most significant correlation is that between the proportion 
of those for whom EU membership is a good thing and per capita contributions – but this 
correlation is positive, contrary to our expectations (Figure 8). Richer states are therefore 
more supportive of the EU than poorer ones, which clearly contradicts our expectations. 
 
 
Figure 7: Citizens’ perception of EU unification and membership 
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Figure 8: Contributions by perception 
 
There are two possible conclusions: either the EU’s peoples are happy to contribute in 
proportion to their wealth to the EU budget, or they are unable to make this connection 
and this correlation is spurious. The one Eurobarometer of 2008 (Flash no. 234) that asked 
respondents to evaluate regional policy comes to equally contradicting conclusions. 
Overall, 85 per cent of citizens agreed that EU Regional Policy should primarily target the 
poorest regions; approval was lowest but still very high in Austria (77 per cent), Denmark 
(79 per cent) and the Czech Republic (80 per cent) (ibid. 13–4). Nevertheless, 58 per cent 
also thought that the EU should help all its regions; only in Portugal and Spain (two 
“traditional” net recipients) was a majority of the view that the EU should focus on the 
poorest regions exclusively (ibid. 14). Finally, at the regional level, Osterloh (2011: 20–1) 
finds that the more both region and country benefit from structural funds, the more its 
citizens support EU membership, controlling for education, ideology, income, and 
duration of a citizen’s country’s EU membership, amongst others. In particular, “an 
increase of per capita transfers [to one’s region] by 100 Euro increases the probability of 
being supportive of the EU to the extent of 11%” (Osterloh 2011: 19–20), and “being a 
direct recipient of structural funds increases the probability of supporting the EU by 
13.2%” (Osterloh 2011: 27). Crucially, though, “spill-over within the countries” (Osterloh 
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2011: 29) makes the nation-level citizenry in general more supportive of the EU. 
 
4. Comparative Reflections 
 
Comparing the data on Switzerland and the EU, several observations can be made. The 
findings on Switzerland are much clearer in pointing to the existence of inter-cantonal 
solidarity and its direct link with fiscal equalisation. The vast majority of Swiss people and 
cantons supported the new financial equalisation system in 2004. The three cantons that 
voted against the new system did so not because they were generally against any form of 
equalisation and redistribution, but because they were net-contributors that had to 
contribute the most to the equalisation mechanisms and received no (Zug) or only little 
(Schwyz and Nidwalden) support. However, the fact that other cantons whose 
contributions would also be higher than their gains voted in favour of the NFA 
demonstrates the existence of strong bonds of solidarity and the recognition among Swiss 
citizens that some form of fiscal equalisation should exist to ensure equal opportunities 
across the country. 
Moreover, while the three cantons that voted against the NFA are German speaking 
and predominantly Catholic, the fact that other cantons – German, French and Italian 
speaking as well as both Protestant and Catholic ones – voted in favour of the new fiscal 
equalisation scheme demonstrates that the recognition of solidarity amongst cantons cuts 
across established cleavages. Probably a major reason why so many people voted in favour 
of the NFA was the fact that it was carefully “packaged” to ensure most cantons would 
profit from it (hence the three pots) and that especially the bigger cantons would be in 
favour of it, creating thus not just a cantonal but also a popular majority (Schaltegger and 
Frey 2003, 253). 
Our discussion and data on the EU are less clear. This has to do with the fact that the 
EU, unlike Switzerland, never had a referendum on Regional Policy or fiscal equalisation. 
Therefore, conclusions remain limited. Nevertheless, we can clearly see that most citizens 
believe their country’s membership in the EU to be a good thing. There is also both 
general support for the EU’s Regional Policy and a specific positive perception of the EU 
in recipient regions, although data on this are relatively sparse. Clearly, support for the EU 
is related to direct benefits from membership in the EU, be they Regional Funds, more 
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political prestige or an improvement of a country’s security. Furthermore, the strong 
support for Regional Funds allows us to conclude that there is a general awareness among 
European citizens about the need for fiscal equalisation, which furthermore seems to 
“spill-over” from the regional to the national realm. While there might not (yet) be a EU 
“togetherness”, a certain degree of implicit solidarity amongst the EU’s constituent units 
can nevertheless be observed when interpreting the data.  
Are there general lessons to be learnt from this comparison and what implications does 
our analysis have for inter-territorial solidarity within the EU? The first lesson is that there 
is a direct link between solidarity and fiscal equalisation and that the two reinforce each 
other. We have shown this in our analysis of Switzerland, but even the more limited 
analysis of the EU has demonstrated that citizens support the EU if they benefit from it, 
and that they are able to understand the need for fiscal equalisation in a complex multi-
level system such as the European Union. 
The second lesson is that the success of both fiscal equalisation mechanisms lies in the 
fact that many profit, while there is only a small number of “losers” – in the case of the 
EU, at the state-level there are literally none! This means that one of the reasons why 
people support the EU’s structural funds across the Union and voted in favour of the NFA 
in Switzerland is because their canton/state would profit from it in one way or another. 
A third lesson is the obvious need for constant re-negotiation and flexibility. Both 
within the EU and its Member States, but also among the Swiss cantons and between the 
Swiss cantons and the Confederation, there is a permanent dialogue about the 
arrangements for fiscal equalisation. Be it through regular budget debates or as part of 
specific reform packages, fiscal and economic conditions change and adjustments are 
therefore frequently required. However, this dialogue also ensures the best use of funds 
and is important, because it gives fiscal equalisation and therefore the whole polity more 
legitimacy. Debates – or “deliberation”, for Besson (2007) – are what ultimately make the 
virtuous circle of solidarity, equalisation and legitimacy turn. 
This brings us back to our theoretical discussion at the beginning. While we have 
stipulated that solidarity is a prerequisite for fiscal equalisation and fiscal equalisation in 
turn strengthens solidarity, it is important to emphasise that the existence and re-
adjustment of fiscal equalisation gives polities such as Switzerland and the EU further 
legitimacy. If people feel that their needs are addressed and that policy decisions have a 
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positive long-term impact, then they are more likely to support policies and accept tough 
decisions by elites. It comes as no surprise therefore that access to Regional Funds is one 
of the main reasons why other countries want to join the EU. Thus, fiscal equalisation 
contributes not only to economic development, but also to creating a “factual solidarity” 
amongst different territorial communities. 
Going back to theories on comparative federalism and federation, what can be learnt 
from our comparison is therefore not that fiscal equalisation is the answer to all problems 
of legitimacy and democratic deficits. However, fiscal equalisation, if designed properly, 
strengthens solidarity and this in turn increases the legitimacy of the overall political 
system. In that sense, the current fiscal crisis within the EU might well function as a trigger 
to strengthening inter-territorial solidarity through more explicit redistributive policies. 
What differentiates the conditions for these from a classic understanding of nation-state 
building is that instead of being inter-personal, solidarity now “only” needs to be inter-
territorial, given that EU Member States are themselves sufficiently legitimated to ensure 
that the other two types of solidarity – inter-personal and inter-group – are operating 
within them in a complementary fashion. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This article has tried to shed some light on the complex and dynamic relations between 
territorial solidarity, fiscal equalisation and legitimacy in multilevel settings. We have 
compared two political systems: While Switzerland benefits from a high degree of solidarity 
and legitimacy, which together were able to make a reform of its fiscal equalisation become 
overwhelmingly approved (Braun 2009), in the EU equalisation is formally vertical (from 
the EU to the regions) but factually horizontal (inter-state payments), making it both 
difficult and contentious to compare each individual member’s costs and benefits. 
Of the many conclusions that we have already drawn, only the most important deserves 
to be repeated here: to be able to contribute to the legitimacy of a federal political system, 
fiscal equalisation needs to address inter-territorial differences and allow for an agreement 
on how best to transform abstract solidarity into specific benefits. For this process to work 
in the EU, three conditions need to be fulfilled. The EU would first have to completely 
overhaul its intricate system of inter-territorial funding. This should include new criteria for 
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regions being awarded funding and a more direct link between those who contribute and 
those who receive to strengthen horizontal solidarity amongst regions and countries. 
Second, to alleviate tensions arising from this new situation, the EU would need to 
increase its own budget. An efficient and legitimate system of fiscal equalisation that 
produces “win-win situations” is expensive, as has been demonstrated in the case of 
Switzerland. Finally, the EU should allow its constituent units to bindingly express their 
consent. While the data used for the EU reveal strong support for EU Regional Funding, 
linking one of the biggest success stories of EU integration to people’s perception of the 
overall polity would not only increase the legitimacy of the Union, but would also allow 
people to recognise the positive effects of their country’s membership in the EU. The 
paradox is, of course, that all three steps require a prior commitment to “make sacrifices”, 
i.e. an initial degree of inter-territorial solidarity. Nevertheless, the current fiscal crisis might 
provide exactly such an opportunity and thus create a “critical juncture” in which structural 
constraints are temporarily relaxed to allow for the kind of agency that Barroso himself 
emphasised. 
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I Of course we are also aware of the differences between Switzerland and the EU, in particular the fact that 
the EU is neither a state, nor a mono-national polity (Dardanelli 2008). However, for the purposes of this 
paper and its particular focus on fiscal equalization, we believe that both similarities and differences in 
structures, aims and implementation of fiscal equalization allow for a useful comparison.  
II On the Swiss cantons as “cantonal democracies” cf. Vatter (2002). 
III In the broad sense as defined by Watts (1996: 6–7). 
IV See, amongst many others, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 9 October 2012, p. 5; 15 October 2012, p. 3; and 
18 July 2012, p. 5, as well as 6 February 2013, p. 3, respectively 
V Switzerland has four official languages: German, French, Italian and Romansch. The majority of Swiss 
speak German, followed by French. Italian is spoken only in Ticino and some areas of Graubünden; the latter 
is also the only canton in which Romansch is spoken.  
VI The religious cleavage divides cantons with a protestant majority and cantons with a catholic majority, and 
leaves only a few bi-confessional cantons. 
VII E.g. by Zurich, Zug or Schwyz: cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 20 October 2012, p. 11; but also by 
recipients like Berne: cf. Tages-Anzeiger of 14 October 2012. 
VIII We shall use “structural funds” and “regional policy” interchangeably, referring to the sum total of money 
disbursed via the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the 
Cohesion Fund and for projects in European territorial cooperation as well as regional competitiveness and 
employment (cf. Evans 2004, 2). 
IX This was the case until the bailouts for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Since then the EU Member 
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States have set up the ESM, which casts a form of horizontal financial equalization to some extent. However, 
the bailouts for some Eurozone countries are not given as grants but as loans. 
X Source: Folketing EU Information Centre, at http://www.euo.dk/euo_en/spsv/all/79 (last updated 15 
February 2012, last accessed 12 October 2012). Contributions include only individual countries’ contributions 
in the form of own resources; administration costs not included in EU expenditures. Method: a) proportion 
of individual country’s contribution of total contribution of VAT and GNP; taken to calculate b) the amount 
Member State should receive from the EU if there were to be a balance between payments and receipts 
between the Member State and the EU; c) amount country actually receives from EU minus b) and minus 
individual country’s contribution to financing the British rebate; d) divided by population (EUROSTAT). 
XI Source: EES 2009; variables: q80 (respondent’s attitude to European unification): from 0 = “unification 
has already gone too far” to 10 = “unification should be pushed further”; and q79 (EU membership good or 
bad): 1 = “good thing”, 2 = “bad thing”, 3 = “neither”. 
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